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This article examines key privacy and data protection concerns raised by the Regulations that
establish a framework for interoperability between EU-wide centralized information systems
processing personal data of third-country nationals (Schengen Information System II, Visa
Information System, Eurodac, Entry/Exit System, European Travel Information and
Authorization System, European Criminal Records Information System for third-country
nationals). After a concise outline of the complex landscape within which these databases have
been set up, emphasis is placed on the novelties and challenges that interoperability brings
forward. In that regard, the articles evaluates the setting up of new databases, particularly the
Biometric Matching Service and the Common Identity Repository – viewed through the
Panopticon lens – the maximization of uses for which personal data may be destined, the
revised rules on consultation of databases for law enforcement purposes, the challenge of ensuring
data quality and the exercise of individual rights.
Keywords: Interoperability, Privacy, Data Protection, Databases, SIS II, VIS,
Eurodac, EES, ETIAS, ECRIS-TCN
If the EU uses its law enforcement and border control tools to the full, exploits the potential of inter-
operability between information sources to identify any security concerns from a common pool of
information, and uses the stage of entry into the EU as a key point for security checks to take place,
the result will negate the ability of terrorist networks to exploit gaps. This is at the heart of the
Security Union.1
1 INTRODUCTION
In May 2019, Regulations 2019/8172 and 2019/8183 were officially adopted, estab-
lishing a framework for interoperability among EU-wide information systems for
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1 COM(2016) 602 final, 4.
2 Regulation (EU) 2019/817 [2019] OJ L135/27 (collectively Interoperability Regulations).
3 Regulation (EU) 2019/818 [2019] OJ L135/85 (collectively Interoperability Regulations).
third-country nationals. Harvesting the possibilities offered by technological evolution
and under the pressure of achieving a ‘Security Union’, the Regulations overall aim at
improving security in the EU, allowing for more efficient identity checks, improving
detection of multiple identities and assisting in the fight against irregular migration.4
To those ends, interoperability brings together the existing and forthcoming informa-
tion systems for third-country nationals (Schengen Information System II – SIS II, Visa
Information System – VIS, European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), Entry/Exit System –
EES, European Travel Information and Authorization System – ETIAS, European
Criminal Records Information System for third-country nationals – ECRIS-TCN),5
by creating four interoperability components; the European Search Portal (ESP), a
Biometric Matching Service (BMS), a Common Identity Repository (CIR) and a
Multiple Identity Detector (MID).
This article critically evaluates the InteroperabilityRegulations from the perspective
of fundamental rights, in particular the rights to private life and protection of personal
data, as enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
respectively. To that end, the next section maps the complex landscape by tracing
three historical periods in the development of European centralized databases for third-
country nationals and offers a typology of key common characteristics underpinning their
operation so as to inform the subsequent analysis. Then, focus is placed on the story
behind interoperability and an assessment of its main components. Five themes are
explored in that respect: the establishment of new databases, viewed through the lens
of the Panopticon metaphor, the meta-use of stored data for additional purposes, the
revised procedure for consultation of data for law enforcement purposes, the quality of
personal data processed and the exercise of individual rights. It is argued that interoper-
ability will not solve existing flaws in the legal bases and operation of the underlying
systems and that rather the aggregation of data raises further privacy challenges and may
accentuate existing pathologies of the underlying systems. Finally, insights into the future
of interoperability are provided followed by concluding remarks.
2 THE COMPLEX LANDSCAPE OF EU CENTRALIZED DATABASES
FOR THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS
2.1 A SKETCH
The development of European information systems may be systematically categorized
in three distinct eras; the initial steps to employ technological means for the purposes
of immigration control and law enforcement; the systematization of databases and the
4 Article 2.
5 For a detailed analysis see Niovi Vavoula, Immigration and Privacy in the Law of the European Union: The
Case of Databases (Brill Nijhoff, forthcoming 2020).
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gradual expansion of their capacities; and the current stage of generalized and normal-
ized surveillance.6 In particular, in the early 90s, the abolition of internal border
controls and the evolution of technology signalled a new phase of modernization in
immigration control and law enforcement. The first centralized databases were con-
ceived; the SIS7 and Eurodac.8 The former, aiming at maintaining a high level of
security within the Schengen area, is an intelligence tool serving both immigration and
criminal law purposes through the registration of alerts on wanted or unwelcomed
individuals and objects.9 Eurodac initially supplemented the Dublin system in deter-
mining the Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum application.10
To that end, Eurodac enabled the cross-checking of asylum seekers’ and irregular
border crossers’ fingerprints, so as to ascertain whether a person has previously applied
for international protection elsewhere.
In the aftermath of 9/11, where migration and security were heavily
intertwined,11 a new, multi-purpose database, the VIS, was conceived, with the
overarching aim to modernize the administration of short-stay visas and seven
ancillary objectives, including the enhancement of internal security.12 Meanwhile,
the SIS and Eurodac were armoured with new objectives and functionalities; the
latter was opened up to law enforcement authorities and Europol under specific
conditions,13 whereas the former (now SIS II) was expanded to record biometric
data and interlink alerts registered under different legal bases.14
Since the past few years, the development of centralized databases has boomed.
The stake of implementing a ‘Security Union’ in the post-2015 era, coupled with the
so-called ‘refugee crisis’ have resulted in increased calls to fill in perceived ‘information
6 For an overview see Niovi Vavoula, Databases for Non-EU Nationals and the Right to Private Life: Towards
a System of Generalised Surveillance of Movement?, in EU Law in Populist Times: Crises and Prospects
(Francesca Bignami ed., CUP, forthcoming 2019).
7 Articles 92–119 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA).
8 Regulation 2725/2000 [2000] OJ L316/1.
9 In specific, the SIS contains alerts on persons wanted for arrest; missing; sought to assist with a judicial
procedure; to be served with a criminal judgment or other documents in connection with criminal
proceedings; subject to discreet checks or specific checks. The system also stores data on objects
(vehicles, boats, aircrafts and containers) for the purposes of discreet or specific checks, and for the
purposes of seizure or use as evidence in criminal proceedings. As regards third-country nationals it
records alerts on irregular migrants and third-country nationals who are convicted or suspected of
committing a criminal offence carrying a custodial sentence of more than one year.
10 Regulation 604/2013 [2013] OJ L180/31.
11 Annaliese Baldaccini, Counter-Terrorism and the EU Strategy for Border Security: Framing Suspects with
Biometric Documents and Databases, 10(1) EJML 31 (2008); Valsamis Mitsilegas, Immigration Control in an
Era of Globalization: Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, Strengthening the State, 19(1) IJGLS 3
(2012).
12 Regulation (EC) 767/2008 [2008] OJ L218/60, as amended by Regulation (EC) 810/2009 [2009] OJ
L243/1 (VIS Regulation); Decision 2008/633/JHA [2008] OJ L218/129 (VIS Decision).
13 Regulation 603/2013 [2013] OJ L180/1 (recast Eurodac Regulation).
14 Regulation1987/2006 [2006] OJ L381/4; Regulation 1986/2006 [2006] OJ L381/1; Council
Decision 2007/533/JHA [2007] OJ L205/63.
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gaps’ and the emergence of centralized databases as a distinct policy field, whereby
each underlying system is progressively disentangled from its border control, asylum or
law enforcement roots. In this framework, surveillance of third-country nationals
through the processing of their personal data is normalized15 by doubling the number
of databases. The EES16 will operate as a ‘Schengen hotel’ by registering the entry and
exit of all third-country nationals admitted for short-stay. The European Travel
Information and Authorization System (ETIAS) will require all visa-free travellers to
the Schengen area to undergo a pre-screening process to obtain authorization prior to
their departure.17 The ECRIS-TCN will enable the exchange of criminal records on
their convictions.18 In addition, the VIS and Eurodac are amidst refurbishment
through an expansion of their scope both ratione personae19 and ratione materiae,
particularly by enlarging the categories of personal data collected20 and modifying
the periods for which the data are retained.21
2.2 A TYPOLOGY
The analysis above provides the basis for enhancing the understanding not only of
the different rationale behind the establishment of each information system, but
also of their common underpinnings. As it has been evident, centralized databases
primarily process personal data of different categories of third-country nationals, be it
asylum seekers, refugees, irregular migrants, short-stay tourists subject to visa
requirements or visa-free travellers and convicted criminals. EU citizens are not
entirely let off the hook, but their personal data are only processed in an incre-
mental manner, for example, by the law enforcement branch of the SIS II; by the
15 Valsamis Mitsilegas & Niovi Vavoula, The Normalisation of Surveillance in an Era of Global Mobility, in
Handbook of Migration and Security 231–251 (Philippe Bourbeau ed., Edward Elgar 2017).
16 Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 [2017] OJ L327/20 (EES Regulation).
17 Regulation (EU) 2018/1240 [2018] OJ L61/1 (ETIAS Regulation).
18 Regulation (EU) 2019/816 [2019] OJ L135/1 (ECRIS-TCN Regulation).
19 The revised VIS will expand to include records on long-stay visa applicants, residence permit and
residence card holders. See COM(2018) 302 final (recast VIS Proposal). The Eurodac will store
personal data on irregular stayers. See COM(2016) 272 final (recast Eurodac Proposal). The SIS II
will include alerts on all return decisions and entry bans. See Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 [2018] OJ
L312/14 and Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 [2018] OJ L312/1. For law enforcement purposes, there is
also Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 (SIS II Regulations).
20 The fingerprint process is revised. Both the VIS and the Eurodac will store the fingerprints of third-
country nationals over the age of six, whereas under the current rules the fingerprints are collected
from individuals over the age of 12 (VIS) and 14 (Eurodac). Furthermore, as regards Eurodac, more
categories of alphanumeric personal data will be collected. See Arts 10–12 of the recast Eurodac
Proposal.
21 According to Art. 17 of the recast Eurodac Proposal, the database will store the records on persons
found irregularly crossing the external border of the EU for five years as opposed to eighteen months.
The SIS II increased the retention period of alerts from three to five years.
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VIS, as regards sponsors or family members of visa applicants, or in the forth-
coming ECRIS-TCN in relation to dual nationals. There can be some overlapping
as to the categories of individuals affected,22 but the full picture of surveillance is
only revealed if all systems are viewed collectively. Under the pressure to cover
‘blind spots’, in the near future, there will be no third-country national whose
personal data will not be monitored through at least one database.23
In relation to each third-country national every database stores and enables the
further processing of a wide range of personal data in various fora and contexts; before their
entry, at the borders, on national territory and after they leave. The types of personal
data collected may range from relatively standard (such as biographical data or travel
documentation) to more intrusive (such as occupation and level of education).
Importantly, with the exception of the ETIAS, databases process different types of
biometrics, particularly photographs and fingerprints, which constitute special cate-
gories of personal data.24 The preference on identifying individuals using their biolo-
gical characteristics is attributed to a number of qualities that they carry, such as their
universality, distinctiveness and permanence.25
Furthermore, databases are adaptable, flexible and dynamic in nature. This is
particularly exemplified by their progressive beefing with additional functionalities
and new purposes, as a response to perceived threats to the Union, primarily linked
to terrorism, and the evolving digital technologies. As a result, the systems are used
for a multiplicity of – often diverging – purposes spanning from modernizing
immigration control to law enforcement, thus heavily blurring the boundaries
between immigration and criminal law.26 Indeed, every system is at the disposal of
national law enforcement authorities, at least to a certain extent, either because of its
law enforcement (security) mandate, as in the cases of the SIS II and the ECRIS-
TCN, or because criminal law is listed as an ancillary objective, as is the cases of
Eurodac, VIS, EES and ETIAS.27
22 For example, both Eurodac and the SIS II store records on irregular migrants. The EES will monitor
the movement of third-country nationals covered by the VIS and the ETIAS. Convicted individuals’
data will be stored in both the SIS II and the ECRIS-TCN.
23 Databases could thus be conceived as the pieces of a puzzle. For further analysis see Vavoula, supra n. 6.
24 Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 [2016] OJ L119/1 (General Data Protection Regulation); Art.
10 of Directive (EU) 2016/680 [2016] OJ L119/89.
25 Anil Jain, Ruud Bolle & Sharath Pankanti, Personal Identification in Networked Society (Kluwer 1999).
For an analysis on implementing biometrics at the borders see Commission, Biometrics at the frontiers:
Assessing the Impact on Society (2005).
26 Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Border Paradox: The Surveillance of Movement in a Union Without Internal
Frontiers, in A Right to Inclusion and Exclusion? Normative Fault Lines of the EU’s Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice (Hans Lindahl ed., Hart 2009).
27 For an analysis see Niovi Vavoula, The Use of European Centralised Databases for Third-Country Nationals
as Law Enforcement Weapons in the Fight against Impunity, in The Fight Against Impunity in EU Law (Luisa
Marin & Stefano Montaldo eds, Hart, forthcoming 2020).
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Finally, the evolution of databases has followed a gradual, compartmentalized
approach, whereby each system has been established under different institutional,
legal and policy contexts. To date the data pots remain air-gapped, separate from
each other, without the possibility to establish direct communication among them.
Not for long though: the Interoperability Regulations will soon alter this structure by
allowing the underlying systems to interconnect in a variety of ways. It is time to
unravel that part of the databases’ story.
3 COMPARTMENTALIZATION IS DEAD! LONG LIVE
INTEROPERABILITY
3.1 A TALE OF TWO REGULATIONS
Debates on the possibility of interconnecting different databases first started in the
aftermath of 9/11,28 with a key issue being whether the then negotiated VIS could be
linked or incorporated into the SIS.29 The Hague Programme also mentioned inter-
operability both in the context of strengthening security (calling for interoperability of
national databases or direct online access including for Europol to existing central EU
databases),30 and in the context of migration management – where the European
Council called on the Council to examine ‘how to maximize the effectiveness and
interoperability of EU information systems’.31 After the Madrid bombings, the
European Council, in its Declaration on combating terrorism, invited the
Commission to submit proposals for enhanced interoperability between SIS II, VIS
and Eurodac. In its Communication on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoper-
ability and synergies among EU databases, the Commission defined interoperability as
the ‘ability of IT systems and of the business processes they support to exchange data
and to enable the sharing of information and knowledge’.32 However, details on the
legal aspect for the interoperability of databases were spared, as the concept was
reduced to a technical rather than a legal or political matter.33
For years, interoperability was discussed, albeit in a sporadic manner, without
being accompanied by concrete proposals.34 Since 2015, the connection of the ‘data
28 Council, Document 13176/01 (24 Oct. 2001).
29 COM(2001) 720 final, at 8.
30 The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, OJ
C53/1, para. 2.1.
31 Ibid., para. 1.7.2.
32 COM(2005) 597 final, at 3.
33 For a critique see Paul De Hert & Serge Gutwirth, Interoperability of Police Databases within the EU: An
Accountable Political Choice?, 20(1–2) IRLCT 21, 22 (2006); EDPS, ‘Comments on the
Communication of the Commission on interoperability of European databases’ (10 Mar. 2006).
34 See for instance The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens
[2010] OJ C115/1, para. 4.2.2; Council, Document 6975/10 (01 Mar. 2010), pt 20.
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pots’ gained fresh impetus in order to address perceived migration and security
threats. The European Council Conclusions of 18 December 2015 clearly referred
to the need to ensure interoperability of all relevant systems to ensure security
checks.35 After the Brussels events of 24 March 2016, the Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA) Ministers adopted a Joint Statement at their extraordinary meeting in
which interoperability was treated as a matter of urgency.36 In the Communication
on stronger and smarter borders, the Commission criticized the ‘fragmentation’ in
the current architecture of databases which are ‘rarely inter-connected’, thus ‘there is
inconsistency between databases and diverging access to data for relevant authorities’,
which ‘can lead to blind spots notably for law enforcement authorities’.37 As a result,
four different models of interoperability were identified, which correspond to a
gradation of convergence among the systems:
(1) A single search interface to query several information systems simulta-
neously and to produce combined results on one single screen,
(2) Interconnectivity of information systems where data registered in one
system will automatically be consulted by another system,
(3) Establishment of a shared BMS in support of various information
systems and
(4) Common repository of data for different information systems (core
module).38
With a view to addressing the legal, technical and operational aspects of the different
options, including the necessity, technical feasibility and proportionality of available
options and their data protection implications, an Expert Group on Information
Systems and Interoperability was set up.39 In the meantime, Member States agreed
in the Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management.40
The undertone for future development was evident and further convergence between
criminal law and immigration control systems was in the making. Although the
Roadmap referred to all information systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice (AFSJ), related to both immigration and law enforcement, it is explicitly stated
that the interlinkages between all different information exchange schemes are high-
lighted, which ‘will contribute to ensuring the cooperation between the authorities
and agencies […] and the interoperability between information systems’.41
35 Council, Document EUCO 28/15, at 3 (18 Dec. 2015).
36 Council, Document 7371/16 (24 Mar. 2016), pt 5.
37 COM(2016) 205 final, at 3–4.
38 Ibid., at 14.
39 Commission Decision [2016] OJ C257/3.
40 Council, Document 9368/1/16, at 5 (06 June 2016). See also Council, Document 7711/16 (12 Apr.
2016).
41 Ibid., at 4.
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In the wait for the Commission proposals, interoperability was already embedded
in the EES,42 ETIAS43 and recast Eurodac proposals.44 In particular, the EES proposal
prescribed interoperability between the EES and the VIS in the form of direct com-
munication and consultation.45 Furthermore, the revised Eurodac46 and the ETIAS47
were envisaged in a way that allows for future interoperability with the other databases
without endorsing a particular model of such links with other systems. As it has been
pointed out, the inclusion of provisions on interoperability prior to the official enact-
ment of the relevant policy or even the adoption of specific proposals must be seen as a
form of pre-empting and staging discussion on interoperability and an insertion
through the back door without an agreement on its necessity and modalities.48
Be that as it may, the final report of the High Level Expert Group on interoper-
ability that was created (HLEG) was released in May 2017, giving the green light for
the setting up of a ESP, a shared BMS and a CIR.49 The die had been cast and in
December 2017, the Commission adopted two ‘sister proposals’ on interoperability;
one building on the Schengen acquis, covering the EES, the VIS, the ETIAS and the
immigration branch of the SIS II50; whereas the scope of the second proposal included
Eurodac, the criminal law branch of the SIS II and the ECRIS-TCN.51 The two
proposals had many common provisions, but were kept separate due to differing legal
bases for cooperation in each field. These proposals were revised in June 201852 and
following speedy and rather limited negotiations, Regulations (EU) 2019/817 and
2019/818 were published in May 2019.53
3.2 INTEROPERABILITY IN A NUTSHELL
Interoperability is defined as ‘the ability to exchange data and to share information
so that authorities and competent officials have the information they need, when
42 COM(2016) 194 final (EES Proposal).
43 COM(2016) 731 final (ETIAS Proposal).
44 Recast Eurodac Proposal, supra n. 19.
45 For a discussion on interoperability prior to the EES proposal of 2013 see Council, Document 13801/
13 (19 Sept. 2013). See Art. 8 of the EES Regulation.
46 Recast Eurodac Proposal, supra n. 19, at 5.
47 See Art. 11 of the ETIAS Regulation.
48 Julien Jeandesboz, Susie Alegre & Niovi Vavoula, European Travel Information and Authorisation System
(ETIAS): Border Management, Fundamental Rights and Data Protection (Study for the European
Parliament, PE 583.148, 2017).
49 HLEG, Final report (May 2017). Option 2 regarding interconnectivity was to be considered on a case-
by-case basis.
50 COM(2017) 793 final (collectively Interoperability Proposals).
51 COM(2017) 794 final (collectively Interoperability Proposals).
52 COM(2018) 478 final; COM(2018) 480 final.
53 It is worth noting that two more Commission Proposals were adopted in early 2019 so as to align the
rules on interoperability between the ETIAS, the SIS II and the ECRIS-TCN. See COM(2019) 3
final; COM(2019) 4 final.
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and where they need it’.54 It must be understood as enabling information systems
‘speaking to each other’ and an evolutionary tool that enables further uses through
the aggregation of data from different sources. In particular, interoperability will
allow faster access to information, enable the detection of multiple identities,
facilitate identity checks of third-country nationals and streamline access for law
enforcement purposes. In addition to the three main components envisaged by the
HELG, the ESP, the shared BMS and the CIR, interoperability further encom-
passes the creation of the MID.
In particular, the ESP will enable competent authorities to simultaneously
query the underlying systems to which they have access and the combined results
will be displayed on one single screen.55 Even though the screen will indicate in
which databases the information is held, access rights will remain unaltered and will
proceed following the rules of each database.56 Furthermore, the BMS will gen-
erate and store templates from all biometric data recorded in the underlying
systems,57 thus effectively becoming a new database compiling biometric templates
from the SIS II, VIS, Eurodac, EES and ECRIS-TCN and will substitute separate
searches. The template does not contain the full (biometric) information as con-
tained in the collected sample, but only represents the particular features selected
by the algorithm(s).58 An extension of the BMS and a novel tool, the MID will use
alphanumeric data stored in the CIR and the SIS II with the aim of detecting
multiple identities. The MID will create links between identical data to indicate
whether the individual is lawfully registered in more than one systems or whether
identity fraud is suspected.59 Therefore, its dual purpose is to facilitate identity
checks for bona fide travellers and combat identity fraud.60 Four types of links are
envisaged; white (in the case of clear identity)61; yellow (in the case of unclear
identity)62; green (in the cases of confused identity, such as two different persons
with similar data)63; and red (in the case of identity fraud).64 At the core of
interoperability lies the CIR, which will store an individual file for each person
registered in the systems containing both biometric and biographical data as well as
a reference indicating the system from which the data were retrieved.65 At the
54 Interoperability Proposals, supra nn. 50–51, at 2.
55 Articles 6–11.
56 Recital 15.
57 Articles 12–16.
58 Els Kindt, Privacy and Data Protection Issues of Biometric Identifiers 98 (Springer 2013).
59 Articles 25–36.
60 Recital 39 and Art. 25.
61 Article 33.
62 Article 30.
63 Article 31.
64 Article 32.
65 Articles 17–24.
INTEROPERABILITY OF EU INFORMATION SYSTEMS 139
heart of interoperability lies the CIR that will combine data from the VIS,
Eurodac, EES, ETIAS and ECRIS-TCN, thus not the SIS II, and its main
objectives will be to enable identification of TCN’s without (proper) travel
documents, assist in the detection of individuals with multiple identities and
streamline the procedure for consulting databases for law enforcement purposes.66
As regards the latter issue, a two-step process is foreseen, whereby law enforcement
authorities will be able to first consult all databases to check whether records on an
individual exist in any of these without obtaining prior authorization or need to
fulfil specific conditions. In the event of a ‘hit’, the second step is to obtain access
to each individual system that contains the matching data must through the
procedure prescribed for each database (hit-flag procedure).67
4 INTEROPERABILITY: THE MESSY ‘GLUE’ THAT BINDS THEM
ALL
With the operationalization of interoperability, the landscape of European information
processing through centralized databases will be forever changed. Interoperability by
default ‘disrespects the importance of separated domains and cuts through their pro-
tective walls’.68 Compartmentalization, which was once praised as a means of safe-
guarding the rights to privacy and personal data protection,69 is viewed as a flaw that
must be remedied.
4.1 THE EMERGENCE OF A DIGITAL ‘PAN-GNOSTICON’: (UNLAWFUL) MASS
SURVEILLANCE IN DISGUISE
Perhaps the elephant in the room as regards to the operationalization of interoper-
ability involves the masked setting up of new databases – the BMS, the CIR and
the MID- based on the combination and aggregation of data from different sources
(albeit the latter will not hold personal data). The fancy wording that is used
(‘component’ and ‘repository’) that has been carefully selected and prevails in the
discussions should not distract from the reality of creating massive catalogues of
third-country nationals at EU level who are either administratively or criminally
linked to the EU that will store personal data over a significant period of time.
66 Article 17(1).
67 Article 22.
68 De Hert & Gutwirth, supra n. 33, at 27.
69 COM(2010) 385 final, at 3. ‘The compartmentalised structure of information management that has
emerged over recent decades is more conducive to safeguarding citizens’ right to privacy than any
centralised alternative’.
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Whereas the MID will not hold personal data, as it will merely store links
among records that definitely or possibly match, a central question that arises is
whether the BMS will process personal data, since it will merely store templates of
the biometric identifiers included in each individual file. Thus, the safeguards
deriving from data protection law, whereby the processing of personal data is a
prerequisite, would not apply. From the outset, it must be stressed that legal
scholarship is not conclusive as to whether biometric templates qualify as personal
data. According to Article 4(1) of the GDPR, ‘personal data’ is defined as:
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person … ; an identifiable
natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an
online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.
On the one hand, it has been argued that finding the person of the template would
require unreasonable efforts.70 On the other hand, it is undeniable that a template
also contains unique information about a person and whereas the intervention of
technology would be required to ‘read’ it and establish the link with an individual,
this does not prevent the conclusion that a template constitutes personal data.71
The Article 29 Working Party had excluded biometric templates from being
considered as personal data only ‘[i]n cases where [these] are stored in a way that
no reasonable means can be used by the controller or by any other person to
identify the data subject’.72 Even if the transformation of biometrics into templates
were to be deemed as a means of pseudoanonymization, the GDPR explicitly
states that such data, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of
additional information – in this case such additional information would derive
from the actual samples stored in each database – should be considered as informa-
tion on an identifiable natural person.73 In the light of the above, the BMS
emerges as a powerful database essentially storing biometric materials (dactylo-
graphic data and facial images). The fact that the ETIAS is not encompassed within
the BMS – because it will not record biometrics – bears no significance to this
finding, since biometrics of visa-free travellers are nonetheless captured by the EES
upon their entry to the Schengen area.
The case of the CIR is equally problematic and constitutes an interference with
the rights to private life and protection of personal data. In essence, the CIR will
70 Pascal Kolkman & Robert van Kralingen, Privacy en nieuwe technologie, in Privacyregulering in theorie en
praktijk 410 (J. M. A. Berkvens & Corien Prins eds, Kluwer 2007).
71 Kindt, supra n. 58, at 94–100. See Mirja Gutheil et al., Interoperability of Justice and Home Affairs
Information Systems (Study for the European Parliament, PE604.947, 2018).
72 Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on Biometrics 5 (WP80, 2003).
73 Recital 26.
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contain an individual file for each person registered in at least one of the databases.
Each file will compile data that are recorded in the different systems – logically
separated in accordance with the system from which the data was originated – and
will comprise of a series of biographical data (names, including aliases, date and place
of birth, nationality, sex, travel documents). The system that holds the full record
will also be indicated. The CIR, therefore, will generate general profiles of millions
of third-country nationals who have crossed or even considered crossing the EU
external borders (e.g. failed visa applicants). It also equates information systems such
as the ECRIS-TCN with a clear law enforcement mandate with the rest, which
include law enforcement as a secondary objective only. As such, the CIR will
become an overarching system and a significant step towards mass and indiscriminate
surveillance of practically the entire foreign population with an administrative or
criminal law link to the EU.
The Foucaultian ‘Panopticon’ metaphor is particularly popular in discussions
about mass surveillance and may be useful to comprehend the effects of
interoperability.74 In essence, the creation of massive digital catalogues will enable
domestic authorities to see all different groups of third-country nationals.
Repetitive references to ‘blind spots’ that need to be covered so that everyone
could be seen fits well with the analogy.75 Whereas each database on its own is a
means of establishing visibility over a significant period of time,76 interoperability
will enable domestic authorities to enhance such visibility and know all the different
categories of third-country nationals better, by assembling records from the differ-
ent systems and combine the different personal data to create richer profiles
regarding their movement and administrative or criminal procedures that they
have undergone. Moving beyond its traditional understanding, the ‘pan-opticon’
(coming from the ancient Greek ‘πάν’ (all) + ‘οπτικόν’ (of sight)) is progressively
replaced by the ‘pan-gnosticon’ (‘πάν’ (all) + ‘γνωστικόν’ (of knowledge)), an
emerging know-it-all surveillance system, whereby authorities will be able to
achieve total awareness of the identities of the individuals, with the ultimate aim
of preventing, deterring, controlling, or in more neutral words ‘managing’ people.
By recording third-county nationals’ identities, everyone will be marked and
sorted out. As such, the EU shall be able to exert significant power on a large
proportion of the non-EU population so that they are excluded from the territory
and/or disciplined within.
74 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish – The Birth of Prison (Editions Gallimard 1975). In the context of
databases see Dennis Broeders, The New Digital Borders of Europe: EU Databases and the Surveillance of
Irregular Migrants, 22 Int’l Soc. 71 (2007).
75 Interoperability Proposals, supra nn. 50–51, at 2.
76 In reality, these catalogues may even amount to permanent registrations (e.g. frequent travellers whose
personal data are stored in the EES, or apply for authorization via the VIS or the ETIAS).
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The conceptualization of the CIR as a tool enabling mass surveillance of
millions of third-country nationals is key in assessing its proportionality. In a series
of judgments, the EU Court of Justice has placed important limits to Member
States’ surveillance powers by scrutinizing the personal scope of the legal instru-
ments in question and implying a distinction between of mass and targeted
surveillance. In Opinion 1/15, concerning the transfer of Passenger Name
Record (PNR) data from the EU to Canada for law enforcement purposes, the
Grand Chamber found that such transfer and use of data prior to their entry to
Canada would not amount to a system of unlawful generalized surveillance, given
that the personal scope of the scheme was limited to those travelling from the EU
to Canada.77 Emphasis was placed on the purpose of the systematic retention and
use of PNR data, which is to facilitate security and border control checks.78
Conversely, in Digital Rights Ireland79 and Tele2 Sverige and Watson80 concerning
the retention of telecommunications metadata for law enforcement purposes, the
Grand Chamber was adamant in proscribing mass surveillance, where it involved
‘practically the entire EU population’ without exception or limitations.81 The
aforementioned pronouncements are central here. Whilst each database on its
own may not qualify as establishing generalized and indiscriminate surveillance
pursuant to Opinion 1/15, because it involves only a fraction of third-country
nationals, the CIR as a new database combining materials from the underlying
systems ticks, including special categories of personal data (biometrics) all the boxes
to be considered as unlawful mass surveillance. The lack of connection with the
SIS II does not alter the fact that all categories of non-EU nationals will be
captured by the CIR, as that system includes alerts on irregular migrants and
criminals, which are already captured by Eurodac and ECRIS-TCN respectively.
The disproportionality is compounded by the fact that the proclaimed aims of the
CIR as a means of identifying individuals is achieved by the individuals systems on
their own without the need to have recourse to an overarching single information
system. Finally, the CIR is at odds with proclamations of the Commission, which
seems to recognize the significant implications of a system as massive and all-
encompassing as the CIR. In its Communication on information management in
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice it was stressed that an overarching EU
information system would ‘constitute a gross and illegitimate restriction of
77 Opinion 1/15 (26 July 2017) ECLI:EU:C:2017:592, paras 186–189.
78 Ibid.
79 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Ireland (08.04.2014) ECLI:EU:
C:2014:238.
80 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen (C-203/15) and Secretary
of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson, Peter Brice, Geoffrey Lewis (C-698/15) [2016] ECLI:EU:
C:2016:970.
81 Digital Rights Ireland, supra n. 79, paras 56–59; Tele2 Sverige and Watson, supra n. 80, para. 105.
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individuals’ right to privacy and data protection and pose huge challenges in terms
of development and operation’.82 In that case, reference was made to a single
information system on third-country nationals from scratch, but the CIR is not far
from that.
A final point must be made here. The creation of the ESP as a message broker
whereby national authorities shall be able to consult a single interface for fast query
results is the sole component of interoperability that does not involve the setting
up of a new database. Nonetheless, its necessity and proportionality may also be
challenged given that their primary purpose has been to increase efficiency of
searches, rather than filling in real operational gaps. Furthermore, it has been
correctly pointed out that the ESP is merely set up to enable the implementation
of new information systems.83
4.2 OF USES AND META-USES OF PERSONAL DATA: DATABASES AS A MOVING TARGET
One of the flagship arguments in favour of interoperability of information systems
has been the fact that it will not frustrate existing limits on access rights of national
authorities.84 In other words, no new categories of national authorities shall be able
to have access to the personal data apart from those already envisaged to have
access to the information stored already. The danger of altering access rights had
indeed been voiced by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), who
highlighted the potential over-reach of those having access to databases under
interoperability noting that the latter ‘should never lead to a situation where an
authority, not entitled to access or use certain data, can obtain this access via
another information system’.85
This represents only one side of the story. What is at stake is the use of personal
data that will be attached to new purposes, which are not always found in the
respective legal bases, and their meta-use due to their combination and aggregation.
These uses should be considered as new interferences with the rights to privacy and
personal data protection. A prime example in that respect involves the use of databases
in the context of the MID to detect persons with multiple identities. Whereas the VIS
and the EES list identity fraud among their objectives,86 Eurodac’s mandate is
primarily linked to the operation of the Dublin system as a supporting mechanism
82 COM(2010) 385 final, at 3.
83 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion on Commission proposals on establishing a framework for
interoperability between EU information systems in the field of borders and visa as well as police
and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration, WP266 4 (2018).
84 See Recitals 17, Arts 6(1), 18(3).
85 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion on the Communication of the Commission on
Interoperability of European Databases (10 Mar. 2006).
86 See Art. 2(c) of the VIS Regulation and Art. 6(1)(i) of the EES Regulation.
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and does not specify such use of the Eurodac data. In order to match this function of
Eurodac under the Interoperability Regulations, another amendment of the legal basis
will be necessary. It is striking that in its report, the HLEG even suggested that the
mandate of Eurodac should be further expanded to include ‘security’ in its purposes in
order encompass.87 Thus, interoperability seems to have become an end in itself that
defines the purposes and sets the uses for personal data that may have been already
collected and stored.
Additional concerns are raised in relation to Article 20 of the Interoperability
Regulations, which empowers national police authorities to query the CIR with
the biometric data of a person over the age of 12 taken during an identity check in
presence of the person in question, for the sole purpose of identifying them.88 The
circumstances under which identity checks may be carried out are: (1) where a
police authority is unable to identify a person due to the lack of a travel document
or another credible document proving that person’s identity; (2) where there are
doubts about the identity data provided by a person; (3) or the authenticity of the
travel document or another credible document provided by a person; (4) or the
identity of the holder of a travel document or of another credible document; or (5)
where a person is unable or refuses to cooperate.89 Where a search indicates that
data on that person is stored in the CIR, the querying authority may access to the
record retained in the CIR and obtain a reference to the underlying data to which
the record belongs.90 A police authority will perform a query if they are so
empowered through national legislative measures that must specify the precise
purposes of the identification, designate the competent police authorities and
prescribe the procedures, conditions and criteria of such checks.91 The purposes
for which queries may take place are those referred to in Article 2(1)(b) and (c) of
the Regulations, namely the prevention and the combating of illegal immigration;
the high level of security, including the maintenance of public security and public
policy and safeguarding security in the territories of the Member States.
This novelty that has been rightly characterized as the ‘most controversial
use(s)’92 of interoperability raises serious proportionality concerns. In essence,
Article 20 merely enables random identity checks to be carried out at the national
87 HLEG, supra n. 49, at 53.
88 Article 20(1). The age limit was added at the behest of the Parliament. Identity checks for minors
below the age of 12 are permitted if it is in the best interests of the child.
89 Ibid. Compare to the Commission Proposals where these circumstances were not listed. See Council,
Document 14691/18, 163–170 (10 Dec. 2018).
90 Article 20(3).
91 Article 20(5).
92 Tony Bunyan, The ‘Point of No Return’ Interoperability Morphs into the Creation of a Big Brother Centralised
EU State Database Including All Existing and Future Justice and Home Affairs Databases, Statewatch, http://
statewatch.org/analyses/no-332-eu-interop-morphs-into-central-database-revised.pdf (accessed 10
Aug. 2019).
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level on the basis of biometric data in the CIR and Member States that wish to
benefit from this facility must circumscribe relevant provisions at the national level.
The only requirement is that the purposes of identity checks must be aligned with
those of fighting irregular migration and ensuring a high level of security. The
wording of the latter purpose is identical to the overarching aim of the SIS II,93
which as mentioned earlier, has a strong law enforcement dimension. The neces-
sity of creating of massive database with records on all third-country nationals for
facilitating identity checks is not demonstrated. The conduct of random identity
checks for both immigration and law enforcement purposes has been accepted by
the EU Court of Justice in several cases94; in Melki, the Court found that where
national measures would not have an effect equivalent to border controls, random
police checks, the aim – of which may be to ‘combat cross-border crime’ – are
permissible.95 Furthermore, in Staatsanwaltschaft Offenburg, the checks were aimed
not only at preventing or terminating unlawful entry into German territory, but
also at preventing criminal offences.96 However, the EDPS is right in pointing
out that these objectives are unduly vague and do not explain whether these
police checks will take place under immigration control or law enforcement
procedures.97 This is crucial as regards to the application of relevant data protection
safeguards, in particular as to whether the higher standards of the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) or the less strict ones in the Police Directive will
apply.98 The addition of specific circumstances under which police authorities are
authorized for identification checks in the adopted text does not compensate for
the lack of clarity. On the contrary, the lack of common criteria and purposes may
lead to highly divergent rules and practices at the national level, whereby third-
country nationals, or EU nationals looking like foreigners, may find themselves
being subjected to different practices depending on how proactive a police
authority in a Member State is. As noted by the Article 29 Working Party (now
European Data Protection Board), ‘querying the CIR … could result in a very
large number of accesses given the volume of identity checks led by police
authorities’.99 Extensive identity checks by police authorities may fuel discrimina-
tory practices based on increased suspicion towards specific categories of indivi-
93 Article 1 of the SIS II Regulations.
94 In line with Art. 21 of the Schengen Borders Code.
95 Joined cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 Aziz Melki (C-188/10) and Sélim Abdeli (C-189/10) [2010]
ECLI:EU:C:2010:363, paras 69–70.
96 Case C-9/16 A v. Staatsanwaltschaft Offenburg (21 June 2017) ECLI:EU:C:2017:483, para. 46.
97 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion 4/2018, at 12–13.
98 Ibid.
99 Article 29 Working Party, supra n. 83, at 11.
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duals, which may proceed to identification checks to third-country nationals on
the spot solely on the basis of extensive (racial) profiling,100 rendering their status
on the territory particularly precarious and sustain a hostile environment. The
checks may simply be based on appearance, irrespective of the behaviour of the
individual or specific circumstances giving rise to a risk of breach of public order.
The risk of discriminatory practices is recognized in the Regulations as it is stated
that ‘Member States shall take into account the need to avoid any discrimination
against third-country nationals’.101 Though this is a welcomed addition to the
original text, the wording ‘shall take into account’ is not particularly strong.
Importantly, no further limitations as to intensity or frequency have been
elaborated.102 This is central since the identity checks against the CIR will take
place on the basis of biometrics, which are special categories of personal data, thus
requiring additional, strict safeguards. Limitations concerning the coercion in
submitting the fingerprints for comparison would have been significant in that
respect. The absence of relevant rules on identity checks seems to repeat the story
of the invalidated Data Retention Directive.103 In Digital Rights Ireland104 and
Tele2 Sverige and Watson,105 both on the retention of telecommunication metadata
for law enforcement purposes, the EU Court of Justice stressed the need ‘for
sufficient safeguards, … to ensure effective protection of the data retained against
the risk of abuse and against any unlawful access and use of that data’.106 It may be
the case that the relevant procedures and criteria will be subject to future harmo-
nization, but this may result in a race to the bottom by embracing the most State-
friendly rules.
Furthermore, the cases of the MID and the CIR are key in understanding the
destructing, deregulating potential of interoperability. It negates the relevance of
the purpose limitation principle107 by essentially enabling databases to be used for
almost any purpose as long as this is not incompatible with the original purpose for
which the data have been originally collected. The multiple reconfigurations of the
systems over time denote that the threshold for such ‘incompatibility’ is impossible
100 See Teresa Quintel, Interoperability of EU Databases and Access to Personal Data by National Police
Authorities under Article 20 of the Commission Proposals, 4 EDPLR 470 (2018).
101 Article 20(5).
102 This has also not been done by the EU Court of Justice. See Case C-278/12 PPU Atiqullah Adil (19
July 2012) ECLI:EU:C:2012:508.
103 Directive 2006/24/EC [2006] OJ L105/54.
104 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Ireland (08 Apr. 2014) ECLI:EU:
C:2014:238.
105 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen (C-203/15) and Secretary
of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson, Peter Brice, Geoffrey Lewis (C-698/15) [2016] ECLI:EU:
C:2016:970.
106 Paragraph 66. This view is shared by the Art. 29 Working Party, supra n. 83, at 12; EDPS, supra n. 97,
at 13 and the Fundamental Rights Agency, Opinion 1/2018, at 26–27.
107 See EDPS, supra n. 106, at 62; Art. 29 Working Party, supra n. 83, at 11.
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to reach and the limits of these systems are far from being exceeded. The fact that
the CIR will include both personal data collected and further processed for
traditional law enforcement purposes (ECRIS-TCN) and personal data of immi-
gration nature that will be used for the identification of individuals in multiple fora
is probably the deathblow to the purpose limitation principle and generally to the
right for respect for private life enjoyed by third-country nationals. This logic does
not correspond to the traditional understanding of migration control, but rather
fosters, validates and accentuates the transformation of information systems for
third-country nationals to ‘security systems’ their reconceptualization as quasi-
intelligence tools.108
One more consideration is due. The fact that access rights are defined in the
legal bases does not mean that this arrangement is immune to flaws. It must be
recalled that the designation of national competent authorities takes place at the
national level,109 on the basis of national administration particularities. Member
States are merely required to communicate their list of competent authorities to
the Commission, which are then published in the Official Journal and may be
amended accordingly. Consequently, there is no involvement, intervention or
control at EU level, as long as that access is provided to national authorities
entrusted with the tasks that correspond to the purposes of each database. This
unfiltered system of designation that provides extensive discretion to Member
States may be prone to abuses, misunderstandings and arbitrary or unclear designa-
tions. This is more than mere hypothesis. It is beyond the scope of the present
article to illustrate the numerous irregularities in the designation of national
authorities granted access to databases. It suffices here to mention that despite the
explicit prohibition in the Eurodac Regulation that intelligence services may not
have access to the system,110 Bulgaria has designated its State Agency for National
Security. As regards Austria, instead of pinpointing specific authorities designated at
the national level, it rather vaguely refers to ‘border control authorities’ and ‘law
enforcement authorities’ without further specification.111 As a result, whilst access
108 See also Niovi Vavoula, Interoperability of European Centralised Databases: Another Nail in the Coffin of
Third-Country Nationals’ Privacy?, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, http://eumigration
lawblog.eu/interoperability-of-european-centralised-databases-another-nail-in-the-coffin-of-third-
country-nationals-privacy/ (accessed 10 Aug. 2019).
109 For the SIS II see, Notices from Member States [2019] OJ C222/1. For Eurodac see eu-LISA, List of
designated authorities which have access to data recorded in the Central System of Eurodac pursuant
to Art. 27(2) of the Regulation (EU) No 603/2013, for the purpose laid down in Art. 1(1) of the same
Regulation (Apr. 2019). The list of authorities that are granted access to Eurodac for law enforcement
purposes is not publicly accessible. For the VIS see Notices from Member States [2016] OJ C187/4;
Notices from Member States [2013] OJ C236/1.
110 Article 5(1) of the recast Eurodac Regulation.
111 The findings are part of an ongoing project carried out by Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild and Niovi
Vavoula.
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rights are not altered at EU level, interoperability does nothing to rectify an
existing pathogenic feature and conceals the fact that whilst new categories of
authorities will not be granted access, the list of authorities is nonetheless created at
the domestic level and is amended at will.
4.3 STREAMLINING LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS BY CIRCUMVENTING AN ALREADY
PROBLEMATIC PROCEDURE
There is an additional reason why the CIR constitutes a disproportionate, thus
unlawful interference with the right to privacy and personal data protection. As
mentioned earlier, one of the main novelties of the interoperability architecture
facilitated by the CIR involves the streamlining of the procedure for allowing
national law enforcement authorities to consult the databases as one of their ancillary
objectives. Under the current rules, law enforcement access to the VIS and Eurodac
and the forthcoming EES and ETIAS is reserved to specific cases for the prevention,
detection and investigation of terrorist offences112 and other serious crimes.113
Consultation of the relevant data stored in a specific database is subject to conditions
custom-made for each database and ex ante verification that these conditions are
fulfilled by a verifying authority.114 In particular, with certain variations, access must
be necessary for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or
other serious crimes, it must be necessary in a specific case, thus ruling out systematic
comparisons, and there must be at least reasonable grounds to consider that the
information contained in the database accessed will substantially contribute to the
objective of addressing terrorism or other serious offences.115 It is also outside the
scope of this article to analyse why the rules on law enforcement access to centralized
databases raise proportionality concerns.116 In a nutshell, whereas the lack of routine
access is a welcomed feature – after all these databases are not law enforcement
tools – the existing safeguards are insufficient in numerous respects. First, with the
exception of Eurodac, intelligence services are not excluded from the authorities that
Member States may designate.117 Furthermore, the conditions of access as such do
112 As defined in Directive (EU) 2017/541 [2017] OJ L88/6.
113 Serious crimes are deemed those listed in Art. 2(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA [2002] OJ
L190/1.
114 Whereas the rules are relatively similar, discrepancies remain. For example, in the cases of Eurodac, the
EES and the ETIAS prior consultation of national fingerprint databases, as well as the automated
fingerprinting identification systems (AFIS) of other Member States must have been conducted (albeit
with exceptions).
115 In the case of the EES and ETIAS, either ‘evidence’ or ‘reasonable grounds’ are required. See Art. 32(1)
(c) of the EES Regulation and Art. 52(1)(c) of the ETIAS Regulation.
116 For an analysis see Vavoula, supra n. 27.
117 Compare Art. 5(1) of the recast Eurodac Regulation with Art. 3 of the VIS Decision, Art. 29 of the
EES Regulation and Art. 50 of the ETIAS Regulation.
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not provide for a high threshold, with the argument being forward that evidence or
factual indications would be more appropriate.118 Moreover, whereas in the cases of
the Eurodac, EES and ETIAS, additional requirements have been inserted mandat-
ing the exhaustion of other sources before seeking access to them, the rules are
fraught with exceptions.119 Finally, from an operational perspective, it has been
highlighted that authorities that are not supposed to have access may still be able to
consult the data indirectly through colleagues who have wider access rights.120
Streamlining the procedure has been prompted by complaints at the national
level that the current ‘cascade mechanism’ is a cumbersome procedure from an
administrative perspective that results in delays and missed opportunities to
uncover necessary information.121 In other words, this procedure, whereby access
is relatively circumscribed and subject to certain safeguards due to its exceptional
character, should be further simplified and watered down for the sake of enhancing
law enforcement capacities. Regrettably, this claim is not substantiated by cases at
the national level demonstrating that such access was denied in the verification
process or was not provided on time. The fact that a procedure is cumbersome
does not mean that it must be overturned altogether. Besides, in all cases, there is a
mechanism of ex-post verification of the conditions of access in urgent cases.122 A
few contextual remarks are also due; first, with regard to the VIS, the latest
statistical data reveal that between 2015 and 2017 eight Member States only
performed almost 28,000 searches, 83% of which to three Member States
(France, Germany and Switzerland).123 Around 800 of these searches were con-
ducted under the urgent procedure.124 As for Eurodac, in 2018, law enforcement
authorities performed 296 searches, out of which a match was found in 201 cases.
These searches have taken place by nine Member States, with two thirds credited
to Germany.125 In both cases, no information is provided as to the aftermath of the
relevant match and in the case of Eurodac there is no further breaking down as to
whether the match involves a victim or a suspected perpetrator. The aforemen-
tioned data reveal significant discrepancies in domestic practices and still fragmen-
tary and inconsistent application, questioning the claim about the necessity to
revise the procedure, which may simply derive from overzealous law enforcement
118 Council, Document 5456/1/07 (20 Feb. 2007).
119 Compare Art. 5 of the VIS Decision, Art. 20 of the recast Eurodac Regulation, Art. 32 of the EES
Regulation, Art. 52 of the ETIAS Regulation.
120 Fundamental Rights Agency, Fundamental Rights and the Interoperability of EU Information Systems:
Borders and Security 25–26 (2017).
121 Interoperability Proposals, supra nn. 50–51, at 23 and 45.
122 See Art. 4(2) of the VIS Decision, Art. 19(3) of the recast Eurodac Regulation, 31(2) of the EES
Regulation, 51(4) of the ETIAS Regulation.
123 eu-LISA, VIS Technical Report 2018, at 26.
124 Ibid., at 26 and 29.
125 eu-LISA, Eurodac – 2018 Statistics, at 8.
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authorities that are responsible for thousands of searches.126 Lack of awareness of
the procedure does not dictate a revision of the existing rules. Besides, if national
authorities do not make use of this functionality, how could they ask for its
reform?127
The pronouncements of the EU Court of Justice are particularly useful when
scrutinizing the revised procedures for law enforcement access. In Digital Rights
Ireland and Tele2, the CJEU made clear first that further transfer to data enlarging
the pool of authorities having access to personal data constitutes a further inter-
ference with the rights to private and data protection128 and second, as mentioned
earlier, that such access should be subject to strict conditions and prior verification
that those conditions have been met by a verifying authority, which must be either
a judicial or independent, administrative one.129 Undoubtedly, interoperability
will progressively lead to routine access. As noted by the EDPS, the existence of
a ‘hit’ – that the indicated database holds a file on the individual in question – is
significant, since it reveals elements of an individual’s personal life, for instance that
they are visa free travellers or asylum seekers, and, therefore, this first step of
checking whether there is personal data in any of the underlying systems should
also take place after fulfilling the specific conditions of access prescribed in the legal
basis of each database.130 Conversely, if there is no ‘hit’, the authorities may have
still acquired some information as regards the individual in question, for example
that most probably they belong to a specific group of third-country nationals.
Importantly, it is hard to believe that upon finding that a database holds informa-
tion on a person, the verifying authority ensuring the conditions for access have
been met will not allow such access. This will be particularly the case when this
function will be used in cases of unknown perpetrators or victims of offences, where
the existence of information on the individual in a system will preempt the
verification of the conditions of access. In other words, not only the independence
and objectivity, but also the very existence of a verifying authority may be biased
by the two-step approach. Arguably, this new function may enable national
authorities to engage in ‘fishing expeditions’. Therefore, more prosecutions and/
126 The Evaluation of the VIS speculates that the relative novelty of the system, lack of awareness among
potential users and technical and administrative difficulties account for these discrepancies. See COM
(2016) 655 final, at 12.
127 There is no information as to whether more Member States attempt to have access but are denied so
by the verifying authority.
128 Digital Rights Ireland, supra n. 79, para. 35. See the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
in Weber and Saravia v. Germany (2008), 46 EHRR SE5.
129 Digital Rights Ireland, supra n. 79, para. 62; Tele2 Sverige and Watson, supra n. 80, para. 120.
130 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion 4/2018, at 17. See also Teresa Quintel, Connecting
Personal Data of Third Country Nationals: Interoperability of EU Databases in the Light of the CJEU’s Case
Law on Data Retention, University of Luxembourg Working Paper 2/2018, SSRN Paper https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3132506 (accessed 10 Aug. 2019).
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or convictions of third-country nationals may take place, merely because a pool of
information exists, since no equivalent EU-wide catalogue of records on EU
citizens exists. This may further sustain a divide between the EU citizens and the
foreigner and raise serious non-discrimination concerns as regards the differentiated
treatment between third-country nationals and EU nationals. Therefore, the
establishment of the CIR may even grow the appetite to expand surveillance of
movement to EU nationals with a view to even out the negative implications for
third-country nationals.
4.4 DATA QUALITY: A THORNY ISSUE
The quality of personal data stored has been a longstanding problem of the
existing databases; spelling errors, lack of documentation, insufficient language
skills, technical deficiencies, incorrect transcription of names into the Latin
alphabet, recording of birth dates when the precise date is unknown, lack of
training are only some of the reasons why databases.131 For example, in the
case of the VIS, it has been reported that the mechanisms securing that only
data of sufficient quality were entered into the system were temporarily
abolished so as to speed up the registration process.132 As such, data quality
suffered. Even if this was a temporary solution, it must be recalled that the
records are retained for five to ten years (in cases of visas granted), thus the
effects of maintaining low quality data remain long after the rectification of
the procedures. These findings are corroborated by immigration controls
officers who confirm that they have identified significant mistakes in the
entry into the data systems over the course of their work.133 If the stored
information is not of sufficient quality, any aggregation of data through
interoperability may have led to incorrect processing, irregularities and false
matches, with significant repercussions for third-country nationals, particularly
in the case of the MID for checking identity fraud.134 Interoperability will
only be as successful as the stored data is. In order to rectify this thorny issue,
the Regulations empower the EU Agency that is responsible for the
131 Vavoula, supra n. 5. See Fundamental Rights Agency, supra n. 106, at 30. See as regards the SIS II see
also COM(2016) 880 final, at 11.
132 eu-LISA, ‘VIS Report pursuant to Article 50(3) of Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 – VIS Report
pursuant to Article 17(3) of Council Decision 2008/633/JHA’ (2016) 10.
133 Inaccurate Data in Schengen System ‘Threatens Rights’, euobserver, https://euobserver.com/tickers/
140468 (accessed 10 Aug. 2019).
134 Evelien Brouwer, Interoperability and Interstate Trust: A Perilous Combination for Fundamental Rights, EU
Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/interoperability-and-inter
state-trust-a-perilous-combination-for-fundamental-rights/ (accessed 10 Aug. 2019). For the implica-
tions of false matches see Case C-291/12 Schwarz v. Stadt Bochum (17 Oct. 2013) ECLI:EU:
C:2013:670.
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operanational management of these information systems (e-LISA) to establish
automated data quality control mechanisms and common data quality indica-
tors, so that only data fulfilling the minimum quality standards.135 This is
certainly welcomed however, as mentioned above, it is not sufficient to
ensure data quality of new data, but further to establish procedures for ex
post correction of incomplete and/or flawed records.
4.5 INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ONLY ON ARTICLE?
A final point regarding the exercise of individual rights merits some attention.
Individuals whose personal data are recorded in the systems are entitled to a series
of rights; to receive information as regards the purposes for and authorities processing
their personal data and to seek access, rectification and deletion of their information,
subject to specific rules and variations depending on the mandate of each database.136
The low turnout in the exercise of individual rights is a key recurring problem of the
current information systems architecture.137 On the one hand, the systematization of
data collection leaves no other choice to individuals but to provide their personal
data in order to adhere to administrative and criminal law procedures envisaged
under Union law. They cannot be considered as having consented to these proce-
dures either. On the other hand, when other fundamental rights are at stake, such as
in the case of asylum seekers, perhaps interest in safeguarding their privacy and
personal data protection is secondary. Thus, it will only be in situations where
individuals are adversely affected that such exercise of individual rights is expected
and that is if the individual in question is in a position to exercise their rights
financially, legally, or even physically, which may not be the case. This perplex
landscape will be further complicated by interoperability, as individuals will lose
foreseeability and thus control over how their personal data will be further processed
in the future, especially since their data will be used in a multiplicity of contexts and
subject to consecutive change. As a result, the right to information, as a basis for the
exercise of the rest of the rights accorded to individuals, may be all the more difficult
to be exercised. The Interoperability Regulations seem to acknowledge this con-
voluted framework therefore a web portal with public information on the exercise of
individual rights is foreseen.138 The extent to which this is sufficient is debatable, as
135 Recital 48 and Art. 37.
136 Compare Art. 67 of Regulation 2018/1862, Arts 52–53 of Regulation 2018/1861 (both on the SIS
II), Arts 37–38 of the VIS Regulation, Art. 14 of the VIS Decision, Art. 29 of the recast Eurodac
Regulation, Arts 50–52 of the EES Regulation, Art. 64 of the ETIAS Regulation, Art. 25 of the
ECRIS-TCN Regulation.
137 For example, as regards the VIS see COM(2016) 655 final, at 12.
138 Article 49.
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the web portal must contain information on the substance of the rights, not merely
on whether they exist and what procedures must be followed. Furthermore, this
provision seems to be a back-up solution, in cases individuals are not properly
informed about their rights at the stage of collection. As for the effectiveness of
the web portal, it remains to be seen whether the exercise of individual rights will
increase in the future.
5 INTEROPERABILITY: A BOTTOMLESS BARREL
The aforementioned considerations are based on interoperability as envisaged in the
Regulations. However, that is not the end of the story. Defined in a flexible manner,
interoperability heralds the beginning of a new era of personal data processing heavily
grounded on technology-based trust amongMember States and increased automation in
information exchange under simplified rules that represent a race to the bottom. The
Interoperability Regulations are merely the stepping stone towards an emerging archi-
tecture of total information awareness in an omniscient Union, whereby decentralized
structures, not limited to surveying third-country nationals, will be interconnected for
the sake of realizing a SecurityUnion. It will not be surprising if new proposals emerge in
the near future linking systems established under the Prüm framework,139 the PNR
Directive140 or the Advance Passenger InformationDirective141 with one ormore of the
interoperability components. This was already mentioned by the HELG in its final
report142 and explicitly mentioned by the Commission in its Proposals.143 Customs
databases on goods will also follow with the discussions progressing even though inter-
operability is still in the making.144 These efforts will confirm not only that the nature of
databases is utterly changed to become ‘security systems’ but also the longstanding view
that modern technological advents, particularly the most controversial ones, are first
‘tested’ on third-country nationals before they make their way to EU nationals.145 The
interoperability apparatus will thus be used to survey and manage the very own subjects
the security of whom is meant to ensure. As it has eloquently been pointed out,
interoperability seems indeed to be the ‘point of no return’.146
139 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA [2008] OJ L210/1.
140 Directive (EU) 2016/681 [2016] OJ L119/132. This fits within the emergence of a Travel Intelligence
Architecture. See Statewatch, Europol foresees key role in ‘the EU travel intelligence architecture’,
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/nov/eu-pnr-iwg-update.htm (accessed 10 Aug. 2019).
141 Directive 2004/82/EC [2004] OJ L 261/24.
142 HLEG, supra n. 49, at 38–40.
143 Interoperability Proposals, at 5.
144 Council, Document 5574/19 (29 Jan. 2019).
145 Ben Hayes, NeoConOpticon: The EU Security-Industrial Complex 35 (Transnational Institute/Statewatch
2009). See Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, Making Design Safe for Citizens: A Hidden History of Humanitarian
Experimentation, 14(1) Citizenship Stud. 89 (2010).
146 Bunyan, supra n. 92; EDPS, supra n. 97, at 10.
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6 CONCLUSION
Interoperability is much more than a buzzword and a panacea to address security
and migration concerns; it is a conscious political choice that has become the
‘Trojan Horse’ towards the silent disappearance of the boundaries between law
enforcement and immigration control and the radical intensification of surveillance
of all mobile third-country nationals. The privacy and data protection implications
are significant; As Bunyan has noted, it is not far-fetched to characterize inter-
operability as a decisive step towards a single EU information system at the service
of an EU Big Brother.147 Interoperability not only frustrates the in-built safeguards
in the operation of the systems, but also changes the interpretation of key data
protection principles, such as purpose limitation, which is confirmed as almost a
dead letter principle. Whereas interoperability is marketed as a means of ensuring
streamlined and seamless access to the stored data, this simplification further adds to
the complexity from an operational and importantly from a legal standpoint and is
bound to deteriorate existing operational flaws in the legal bases, whilst creating
new challenges. With that step completed, it is only a matter of time before PNR,
Prüm and customs data also make their way into interoperable centralized data-
bases, so as to ‘rectify’ the imbalance between the treatment of third-country
nationals and EU citizens in terms of surveillance. Interoperability is the latest
nail on the coffin of third-country nationals’ privacy; databases have progressively
proliferated and their functions expanded without having been litigated in terms of
fundamental rights compliance before the European Courts. In an era where
strategic litigation seems to be the way forward, is it possible for centralized
databases to find their way into courts, or will we have to wait until data
surveillance hits our own door?
147 Bunyan, supra n. 92.
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